

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

DTR-0395

5 July 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Indoctrination and Orientation Film on the Agency

REFERENCE : Memo dtd 30 May 74 to DCI fm A-DCI; same subject

1. A professionally produced film of the type described in the referent memorandum is a very useful medium for briefing and orientation purposes. The Office of Training would make considerable use of it, just as "Need to Know" has been widely used and has more than paid its production costs.

2. While "Need to Know" is now outdated, we have used it for five years and continue to do so occasionally because a more recent film is not available. Undoubtedly, a new film would become outdated in three to five years and another one would be needed; however, we believe the instructional value of a film justifies the cost of a new production every three to five years.

3. One of the limitations of "Need to Know," when using for outside audiences, is its length (33 minutes). After showing the film, the briefer usually has little time to answer questions or further to explain the intelligence function. Therefore, we envision a new film of about 45 minutes that would have a condensed version of about 20-25 minutes for use with outside groups. The longer version would be used in OTR courses and with groups where the time factor is not critical.

4. The Office of Training has one film cameraman (staff employee) and one writer (independent contractor), hardly sufficient personnel resource to produce a film of the quality we need. Our recommendation is that such a film be done professionally by contract. The cost would probably be about \$350,000.7

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Alfonso Rodriguez
Director of Training

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A New Film On CIA?Summary

The DDI Management Staff reviewed the Agency's existing "image" film, "A Need To Know" and conducted a series of talks with qualified employees. We have concluded that:

1. "A Need To Know" is out-of-date and too confined in subject matter.

2. There are good reasons for making a new film and the certainty that it too will become obsolete should not be a deterrent.

3. If a new film is made it should stress that (a) the government has a duty to maintain intelligence organizations to find out denied information about foreign developments affecting its security; (b) citizens of this country gain directly in terms of security and tax savings from the work of this Agency; (c) CIA is strictly accountable for its actions and expenditures; (d) the Agency is a four part organization with collection, analysis and support responsibilities; and (e) CIA is increasingly involved in new activities that are more acceptable to the general public.

4. The production problems and costs involved in making a new film are less than might be expected. A film comparable to "A Need To Know" in length and complexity could probably be produced in less than six months, for less than \$100,000 and with minimum interference with normal Headquarters activity.

I. Introduction

This paper addresses three questions concerning the need for a new indoctrination and orientation film on the Agency.

1. Is there a need for a new film;
2. If there is, what should be its content; and
3. What costs and problems should be anticipated?

To respond to these questions this Staff began by reviewing the existing documentary film about the Agency, "A Need To Know". Produced in 1969, this film was classified Confidential, ran about 40 minutes and focused primarily on the activities of the Intelligence Directorate. The chief reactions of members of our Staff were that the film has commendable aspects but that:

1. It is overlong and overclassified for a film confined largely to the analytical work of the Agency;
2. It is dated by the portrayal of issues and incidents, some already passé at the time it was produced; and
3. It could have been improved not only by showing the work of the other three Directorates but by indicating the Agency's external relationships and responsibilities to the Intelligence Community, the President and the Congress.

We then proceeded with a series of interviews with employees who were in a position to respond to the three questions noted above either because of their experience with "A Need To Know" or because their current duties involve representing the Agency to outside audiences. These individuals were:

1. [REDACTED] Executive Assistant to the Deputy Director and former member of the Advisory Committee on "A Need To Know";
2. Mr. George Carver, Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Officers;
3. [REDACTED] of the Office of the Inspector General and former project manager of "A Need To Know";

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4. [REDACTED] of the Office of Training and principal Agency briefing officer for outside audiences;

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5. [REDACTED] of the Office of the Comptroller and a drafter of the DCI's annual budget presentations to the Congress; and

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6. [REDACTED] of the Intelligence Community Staff (Congressional Relations) and a participant in "A Need to Know".

The views expressed below are largely the result of our conversations with these individuals.

II. The Need For A New Film

Without exception, those interviewed were in favor of making a new film about the Agency suitable for general audiences. Their reasons varied from simply wanting a current replacement for "A Need To Know" to a deep concern about the Agency's image as a result of "Watergate" developments. Several persons commented that a new film would be consistent with the DCI's position on a more public stance for CIA.

When confronted with Mr. Colby's question about whether such films tend to become out-dated too quickly, most responded that this should not be a deterring consideration. The consensus was that the era had passed when the Agency could claim that it had "no public relations" and that making films about its work at six year intervals need not be considered an extraordinary expense. To protect the viability of such films it was suggested that the activities depicted focus more on the constants in the Agency's work and less on historical events. It was also suggested that a "modular" approach could be taken in producing the film which would permit the subsequent replacement of sequences showing a specific President or a CIA Director.

III. The Content of a New Film

Five major themes emerged from our conversations about what might be included in a new film about the Agency. These were:

1. The Need to Know. Most agreed that the current Agency film had been on the mark in its assertion that any nation has an obligation to its citizens to be informed about all foreign developments that may affect their welfare

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and to maintain an intelligence organization to ferret out those facts about such developments which other governments would deny us. Both [REDACTED] and Mr. Carver felt that this idea should be "up front" in any future film, that its legitimacy should be underlined and that the Agency should feel no need to be "defensive" about making this point.

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2. The Value of CIA's Work. Several persons suggested that any new film should strongly represent the practical benefits to the public that accrue from the Agency's work. They offered the following examples: (a) the policy of Detente in general and the SALT agreements in particular which could not exist without the verification provided by intelligence; (b) the fact that the cost of national defense would be markedly higher were it not for the specific knowledge of foreign military capabilities which intelligence operations make possible; and (c) that the effectiveness of the US as a peacemaker in international disputes such as the Arab-Israeli confrontation would be considerably reduced without the clues to the ultimate interests of the contending governments which the Agency can often provide. [REDACTED], in particular, felt that a strong case should be made for the Agency's work as not only cost effective but as a significant bargain for the American taxpayer.

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3. The Agency's Accountability. Most of those interviewed believed that one of the Agency's major "image" problems was the impression that CIA is autonomous in the activities it undertakes and unlimited in its resources. They felt that any new film about the Agency should emphasize that its operations are directed by the President and the National Security Council; coordinated with the Departments of State and Defense and the other elements of the Intelligence Community; annually funded, regularly reviewed and ultimately controlled by the Congress. [REDACTED] suggested that special attention be paid to the DCI's role as leader of the Intelligence Community, to the CIA's elevated but relatively modest place among all US intelligence elements and to the Intelligence Community Staff as a means of coordinating and consolidating the total US intelligence effort.

4. The Need to Show the Whole Agency. There was unanimity among those interviewed on the necessity of depicting the work of all four Directorates in any future film. Some felt that an exposition of the basic organization, including the names of the Directorates, would do no harm in terms of security and would be beneficial in striking a posture of candor with the public. Others thought that a less explicit approach would suffice if it acknowledged that the Agency had components whose functional responsibilities were human collection, technical collection, analysis and support. All believed that another film which concentrated on how intelligence was produced, but not on how it was collected, would not "wash" with contemporary audiences. It was also noted that to be useful as a recruiting device, the film should show that there are at least four major types of careers to be pursued at CIA.

5. The Changing Nature of the Agency's Work. Another frequently mentioned subject in these interviews was the changing mission of CIA and that this fact could be publicized to the Agency's advantage. A new film could point out, for example, that (a) our human collection component is involved almost exclusively in information gathering--not covert action--and is increasingly concerned with issues like economics, international terrorism and the global trade in narcotics; (b) that technical collection has grown enormously in recent years and provides not only a vast quantity of high quality intelligence, but does so at far less risk of international confrontations; and (c) that our analysts, although still concerned with the political intentions and military capabilities of foreign powers, have moved from preoccupation with 'Cold War' issues to questions of international finance, energy supplies, agricultural resources, the use of the oceans and other questions impacting on world political stability.

In addition to these broadly shared ideas about the content of a new Agency film, several individual suggestions about the subject matter and format of this undertaking are worth noting. [REDACTED] felt that the film should be designed for the widest possible use but should be restricted to about 15 minutes in length. His reasoning was that the normal classroom presentation at a college or high school or an after-dinner speech to a civic organization only allows for about 50 minutes. These audiences want a film, but they are most interested in time for questions to a live employee of CIA.

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When told of Mr. [REDACTED] suggestion for a 15 minute film, [REDACTED] accepted his rationale but argued that there was also a need for the longer format to show to more studious academic audiences, to military reserve groups and other elements in the intelligence community and to potential employees needing a fuller view of career opportunities. [REDACTED] suggested that if conceived and produced at the same time, the cost of producing two films instead of one might be well worth considering.

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STATINTL Finally, Messrs. [REDACTED] all stressed the need for conducting some thorough "market research" with target audiences prior to getting underway with any new film. [REDACTED] noted that an advisory panel of three academicians had been consulted before making "A Need to Know", but that they had not been very helpful. Nevertheless, one of the reasons why this film became so dated so soon was that it represented what people in CIA thought the public should know about the Agency, not what those on the outside actually wanted to know. [REDACTED] suggested that determining what was wanted could best be accomplished by an independent market research team.

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IV. Production Costs and Problems

STATINTL [REDACTED] the project manager for "A Need to Know", provided the most valuable information on this topic. Three documents from his files dealing with the organization of that project in the fall of 1958 are included at annex.

STATINTL The costs of producing such a film are less than one might expect. "A Need to Know" was budgeted at \$68,000 in FY 1969 funds and, although the actual figure was not available from [REDACTED], OTR or the Office of Logistics, all participants agreed that the total cost was about \$10,000 less than that amount. Assuming the same length of film, the cost would be considerably higher in FY 1975 or 1976, but probably still under \$100,000.

STATINTL The chief difficulty in producing such a film is not in the shooting, but in agreeing on the script. This was accomplished last time by giving the job to an independent contractor, [REDACTED] after providing him with numerous briefings by those components of the Agency that were featured in the film. [REDACTED] suggested that the same approach could be used this

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STATINTL time and specifically recommended the re-hiring of [REDACTED] --but only after a more detailed agreement had been hammered out about the content of the film by an Advisory Committee representing all components of the Agency. The script for "A Need to Know" took about one month to produce.

STATINTL Actual production of the last film required about two months. The small professional crew was assisted by OTR representatives and no major problems were encountered. The impact on the normal work of the Agency was considered to be minimal. In casting the film, [REDACTED] noted that care had to be taken of the cover status of the actors. Even though only DDI personnel were used as actors, their spouses were occasionally employed in another Directorate. [REDACTED] thought that in any new film STATINTL emphasis should again be given to including women and minority group representatives among the participants. [REDACTED], on the other hand, reported that college groups and some other audiences reacted adversely to the high percentage of black faces in group scenes, contending that the Agency was making a contrived effort to show itself as an equal opportunity employer.

DDI Management Staff

Attachments:
As stated